Protest without Fear

August 9: Belarus Presidential Election (contested)
Alexander Lukashenko: 80.1%
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya: 10.12%
Hanna Kanapatskaya: 1.67%
Andrey Dmitriyeu: 1.2 %
Siarhei Cherachen: 1.14%
Against All: 4.59%

Alexander Lukashenko, an aging autocrat who ruled Belarus for twenty-six years, faced election for the sixth time on August 9. During the last presidential election, in 2015, the electoral process worked like a well-oiled machine: Public spaces for campaigning were severely limited, and while handpicked political opponents were registered, there was little public interest in the election. There is no presidential term limit, since it was removed by a national referendum in 2004, nor were there new constitutional changes to be put to national vote. Opposition parties and movements have played a limited political role in the country but up until recently have not had enough popular appeal to challenge the status quo. When the election date was announced in May, there was little doubt that Lukashenko would be reelected for another five-year term.

But this year, the election was different.  The main political opponent, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, a former English teacher who ran in the place of her husband, quickly gained traction by creating a coalition with other alternative campaigns and opposition groups, drawing large crowds and an upswell of popular support. Social and political grievances, many of them revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic, mobilized Belarusians. When the initial results came in announcing that Lukashenko had won 80% of the vote, large-scale protests broke out: A country that had observed arrests of political opponents, the disregard of procedural rules and meddling in the election process was sure the results had been rigged.

Two months since the beginning of the immense political protests, a political crisis of a scale not seen since it gained independence in 1991, the Belarusian government and protesters have reached a stalemate. Lukashenko remains in control of the country’s security apparatus; he has shifted from mass to targeted repressions and enlisted comprehensive support from Russia, providing informational, financial and security fortification for the regime. However, protesters show no signs of backing down and continue to be creative in their political resistance strategies in spite of repression. For the first time, the political future of Lukashenko is uncertain. Belarusian people have collectively become the formidable opponent no one expected in the presidential election that could challenge the longevity of the autocrat.

When the election date was announced on May 8 during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, state authorities did not expect a challenging political campaign. But the more alternative candidates announced their bids for presidency, the stronger the challenge to Lukashenko. A first round of election repressions targeted the campaigns of popular male opponents. Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a video blogger, was not given a chance to register as a preliminary candidate. Viktar Babaryka, a former banker who also wished to run for election, was considered a frontrunner, as his team gathered four times the number of signatures for his nomination. Babaryka was detained and later charged with tax evasion and money laundering, together with his son, who had been working as campaign manager. The registration process of presidential candidates barred another contender, Valery Tsepkalo. Too many of submitted signatures were declared invalid.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Tsikhanouski's wife, decided to run in his place. (Tsikhanouski became her campaign manager but was soon arrested.) Excitement for Tsikhanouskaya’s campaign grew after representatives of the other oppositional campaigns, Maria Kalesnikava and Veranika Tsepkala, joined forces with her. Three women reaching an agreement on a political coalition was new in the history of Belarus’s opposition, which often stayed divided. Together, they promised to call for a new election, which will be free and fair, and to release all political prisoners.

Since that moment, Tsikhanouskaya’s campaign started to gain political momentum: it saw the largest election rallies both in the capital and regional cities, domestic fundraising of campaign funds, significant media presence and the active use of social media networks. Tsikhanouskaya’s position was strengthened by Lukashenko’s open disdain: He claimed that Belarusian society was not mature enough to vote for a woman. Stating that the Belarusian constitution is not designed for a female leader, Lukashenko only highlighted what voters understood: that the personalist autocracy and a powerful presidency with no institutional constraints was meant for him alone.  

Belarusian society has changed since Lukashenko came to power in 1994, during the country’s first presidential election. Lukashenko’s age cohort, those who are over 60, is now outnumbered by younger generations of voters, those who are under 50. The economic contribution to the state of the older Belarusians is lower than that of younger age groups. A new generation of voters have no memory of the Soviet Union, or of any other president. Belarusians are increasingly mobile, establishing transnational links, settling abroad. 79 percent of the population has Internet access, a figure which continues to increase, as does the number of Belarusians engaged in the IT sector.

When the COVID-19 pandemic emerged in Belarus, Lukashenko was deaf to public concerns and grievances about the impacts of the disease, dismissing it as a psychosis. The government’s public health measures and communication with the public were considered as a failure, which resulted in growing mistrust of official statistics. Local civic initiatives and crowdfunding platforms filled the gap, delivering protective gear to medical workers, helping vulnerable groups with supplies, and informing the public about protective measures against COVID-19. These efforts meant that when the election campaign began, people were more drawn to alternative candidates.

Protests broke out at the end of the election day after the announcement of preliminary results, followed by three days of state-sanctioned repressions against demonstrators and journalists and systematic ill-treatment and torture in detention centers. The most prominent image of the first days of protests, which stayed with me, is a photograph that Volha Shukaila took in Minsk on August 10, on the second day of brutal post-election crackdown. Five women of different ages standing arm in arm in the first row of the protest chain. Behind them there are faces of young men. In the first days of the post-election protests, mainly young men were detained, beaten and abused. Women stepped up and mobilized in response. Women’s led mobilization aimed at creating safe public spaces for expressing public discontent and grievances.

An initial restraint in using mass repressions against female demonstrators ended on September 12 during the Saturday women’s march, when dozens of female peaceful protesters were detained. The image of a female protester in the Belarusian political context is astounding: it challenges the what many had believed about women’s political participation in authoritarian politics.

The first week of women’s peaceful demonstrations motivated other people to join protest marches. I was one of them. I joined the first Sunday march on August 16, wearing white and feeling elevated by people greeting each other and cars honking in support.  One woman was holding a poster saying “The person of the year is a factory worker” in support of striking workers in factories in state-controlled industries. Walking alongside other demonstrators in a big column toward the meeting venue, I saw faces of Belarusians of different ages, genders and professions, smiling and waving the white-red-white flag. (This flag, replaced in the national referendum of 1995 by the current official red and green one, has long been associated with political opposition to Lukashenko).

I realized that we might hold different—even opposing—political views, but together we were imagining a future in which our voices would count. That moment was full of hope and promise.

Throughout two months since the beginning of protests, demonstrators and political activists have continued peaceful protests. When mobile Internet is down, as it is during the weekend marches which continue to this day, demonstrators rely on word of mouth and join self-organized big groups of demonstrators. Neighborhoods in Minsk have created local chat groups to share news and discuss events. Significant funds were raised by Belarusians to help counter political repression. Several grassroots initiatives as well as Belarusian expatriates coordinated the campaign and helped to distribute the funds for paying heavy fines and legal assistance, compensating the injured, and assisting those who resigned from the state security apparatus with their job hunts.

But the post-election repressions against the political opposition have resulted in arrests and forced exile from the country of key political actors, including Tsikhanouskaya, who is now based in Lithuania. To provide the voice for the protest movement in Belarus, Tsikhanouskaya initiated a coordination council – a non-government body for voicing political demands and starting a dialogue with Lukashenko’s government. However, the state authorities refused to recognize the political mandate of the coordination council and have arrested its key leaders, while forcing other members to flee the country. Autocratic elites will prevent any efforts of establishing a new political body demanding dialogue.

Demonstrators have continued to display their commitment to political resistance.  But the crackdown of the government has increased. On October 2, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revoked the accreditation of all foreign journalists, affecting the work of several media outlets that were covering Belarusian news. The Ministry of Information then suspended the media status of TUT.BY, the most popular Belarusian news media organization. 60 journalists were detained in September alone, according to the Belarusian Association of Journalists, while other incidents of repression, administrative arrests and fines have passed the mark of 300. Most recently, on October 11 during the Sunday protest march the security forces returned to its brutal tactics seen during the first week of post-election protests: the use of stun grenades, water cannons, and massive arrests and beatings of protesters. First Deputy Interior Minister threatened to use lethal weapons against protesters, which could provoke new escalation of violence in a politically volatile situation.

There is no roadmap out of the current political crisis. Lukashenko’s government might claim that it is in control of the situation. After the first wave of defections from state institutions, the political system consolidated and now consists of public officials who display loyalty to the regime. Lukashenko has maintained the control of the state security apparatus and political institutions and has received backing from Russia. He was inaugurated to the presidency in an unannounced, untelevised ceremony on September 23. In the current crisis, Russia will protect its political interests and influence, if not control, in any succession or power transition scenarios.

A prolonged political crisis in Belarus will lead to a new wave of emigrations. Political isolation and expected economic stagnation will force educated and skilled Belarusians to seek employment outside Belarus. IT companies that were bolstering the economy have already announced plans to relocate to neighboring countries. University students and student activists who have come under immense pressure from the police and university administration since the start of the fall semester might also leave the country to find more welcoming and freer academic environments.

But the winning advantage of the Belarusian protest movement over the unreformed autocratic system and the aging autocrat is its youth. What the political opposition and protest movement has already achieved is to imagine the future of Belarus without Lukashenko. The unresolved question is whether pro-democratic voices can enact their vision of Belarus in the future, and if so, when?

Also in this issue: inside accounts from journalists caught in Lukashenko’s deportation machine.